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Bill E. Davidoff***THE major developments in the field of civil procedure during the
Survey period occurred through judicial decisions.
I. SUBJECT-MATIER JURISDICTION
In City of El Paso v. Heinrich, the Texas Supreme Court held that
"while governmental immunity generally bars suits for retrospective
monetary relief, it does not preclude prospective injunctive remedies in
official-capacity suits against government actors who violate statutory or
constitutional provisions."' Recognizing the well-settled rule that sover-
eign immunity cannot be avoided simply by relabeling a suit for damages
as a declaratory judgment claim, the supreme court nevertheless recog-
nized that the courts may compel a state official to comply with constitu-
tional or statutory mandates, even if doing so would in effect compel the
payment of money.2 Such a suit would lie only against state officials act-
ing in their official capacities, not the governmental entity itself.3
In Graber v. Fuqua, a divided Texas Supreme Court held that the fed-
eral bankruptcy code does not preempt a state law claim for malicious
prosecution arising out of an adversary proceeding in a bankruptcy case.4
The supreme court noted that it is well established that Federal Rule 11
of Civil Procedure5 does not preempt malicious prosecution claims aris-
ing out of federal civil actions, and that there was no indication that Con-
gress's adoption of that rule's bankruptcy counterpart, Federal Rule of
Bankruptcy Procedure 9011,6 was intended to do so.7 Nor is preemption
* B.A., Dickinson College; J.D., New York University School of Law. Partner,
Figari & Davenport, L.L.P., Dallas, Texas.
** B.S., University of Colorado; J.D., Boston University School of Law. Partner,
Figari & Davenport, L.L.P., Dallas, Texas.
*** B.B.A., University of Texas; J.D., Southern Methodist University Dedman School
of Law. Partner, Figari & Davenport, L.L.P., Dallas, Texas.
1. 284 S.W.3d 366, 368-69 (Tex. 2009).
2. Id. at 371-72.
3. Id. at 372-73.
4. 279 S.W.3d 608, 609-10 (Tex. 2009).
5. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
6. FED. R. BANKR. P. 9011.
7. Graber, 279 S.W.3d at 613-14.
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"warranted by the risk of disrupting uniformity" in bankruptcy law.8
Thus, the state court action was not subject to dismissal for lack of
jurisdiction.9
Combs v. Kaufman County addressed the transfer of a guardianship
proceeding to a district court judge after the constitutional county court
judge recused herself.' 0 The County argued that the Probate Code re-
quired a transfer to a visiting probate judge." The Dallas Court of Ap-
peals, however, held that section 16 of article V of the Texas
constitution' 2 authorizes the parties to agree to a replacement judge.13
Since no one objected to the district judge's appointment to the case for
several years, the court of appeals held there was subject-matter
jurisdiction.14
The Beaumont Court of Appeals concluded that a district court's sub-
ject-matter jurisdiction requires a minimum amount in controversy of
$200 in Acreman v. Sharp.15 The court of appeals made note of several
Texas Supreme Court cases that questioned, but did not resolve, whether
district courts still have any minimum jurisdictional amount.16 The court
of appeals held, however, that since the Texas constitution vests the jus-
tice of the peace courts with exclusive jurisdiction over claims of $200 or
less, and neither the constitution nor statute establishes any minimum
dollar threshold for district courts, the district court had jurisdiction over
this case involving a $400 dispute.' 7
II. SERVICE OF PROCESS
"For 150 years, the rule [in Texas] has been that a default judgment
cannot be based on an amended petition seeking more onerous relief un-
less the amendment was served with [a new] citation."18 A divided Texas
Supreme Court reversed this long-standing rule in In re E.A.1 9 The ma-
jority based its decision on the 1990 amendment to Texas Rule of Civil
Procedure 21a,20 which provides for several methods of delivery, includ-
ing certified or registered mail, for every type of notice, pleading, or mo-
tion "other than the citation to be served upon the filing of a cause of
8. Id. at 617-18.
9. Id. at 610; cf Brashear v. Victoria Gardens of McKinney, L.L.C., 302 S.W.3d 542,
544 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2009, no pet.) (where one defendant was in bankruptcy at the time
the suit was commenced, "the entire lawsuit was subject to the automatic stay," and the
trial court never acquired subject-matter jurisdiction).
10. 274 S.W.3d 922, 923 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2008, pet. denied).
11. Id. at 926.
12. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 16.
13. Combs, 274 S.W.3d at 926.
14. Id.
15. 282 S.W.3d 251, 255-56 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2009, no pet.).
16. Id. at 254-55; see, e.g., Dubai Petroleum Co. v. Kazi, 12 S.W.3d 71, 75 n.4 (Tex.
2000).
17. Acreman, 282 S.W.3d at 255-56.
18. In re E.A., 287 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Tex. 2009) (Brister, J., concurring).




action." 21 Thus, the majority concluded that service under Rule 21a satis-
fies the requirement that "a nonanswering defendant must be served with
a more onerous amended petition" before a default judgment can be en-
tered.22 While the majority noted the benefit its new interpretation
would provide in eliminating any confusion over "what constitutes a
'more onerous judgment,' "23 the dissent argued that the "1990 amend-
ment [to Rule 21a] merely consolidated three separate service rules," and
there was no indication in the Advisory Committee notes or otherwise
that it was intended to abrogate the well-established rule regarding the
need for a new citation. 24
The Texas Supreme Court considered the sufficiency of "the clerk's en-
dorsement of the return of citation" in Insurance Co. of the State of Penn-
sylvania v. Lejeune.25 In Lejeune, the defaulting party argued that the
clerk's endorsement was defective because it failed to include the hour of
receipt of citation as required by Rule 16.26 The supreme court agreed,
holding that even though the defendant was served by certified mail, the
return must still show the hour of receipt, and in its absence, the default
judgment could not stand.27
Most trial practitioners are aware of the rule that the filing of a suit just
within the limitations period will not be timely unless the plaintiff exer-
cises diligence in issuing and serving citation.28 MauriciO v. Castro
teaches that even a relatively brief period of delay in effecting service
must be explained in order for a plaintiff to avail himself of this rule.2 9 In
this case, the plaintiff filed suit fourteen days before the statute of limita-
tions expired. Citation was issued that same day but was not served until
thirty-one days after limitations had run. Because the record contained
no evidence or explanation for this "relatively short delay," the Dallas
Court of Appeals held the defendant was entitled to a directed verdict on
limitations. 30
III. SPECIAL APPEARANCE
In Lamar v. Poncon, the Houston First Court of Appeals upheld the
trial court's decision that the plaintiffs failed to establish specific jurisdic-
tion over out-of-state defendants. 3' Although the plaintiffs also failed to
prove general jurisdiction, the court of appeals reversed the order grant-
21. TEX. R. Civ. P. 21a.
22. In re E.A., 287 S.W.3d at 4.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 7-8. The dissent also noted that commentators, such as the authors, failed to
notice any such change at the time. Id. at 8 n.15 (citing Ernest E. Figari, Jr., A. Erin Dwyer
& Donald Colleluori, Civil Procedure, 45 Sw. L.J. 73, 83 (1991)).
25. 297 S.W.3d 254 (Tex. 2009) (per curiam).
26. TEX. R. Civ. P. 16.
27. Lejeune, 297 S.W.3d at 256.
28. See, e.g., Murray v. San Jacinto Agency, Inc., 800 S.W.2d 826, 830 (Tex. 1990).
29. 287 S.W.3d 476 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2009, no pet.).
30. Id. at 480.
31. 305 S.W.3d 130, 138 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. denied).
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ing the special appearance because the trial court refused to allow the
plaintiffs to take any jurisdictional discovery. 32 The court of appeals con-
cluded that the plaintiffs' affidavits, while not directly contradicting the
defendants' special appearance evidence, were at least sufficient to allow
plaintiffs to explore whether the defendants had contacts with Texas that
were not easily investigated without procuring information directly from
them.33
Boyd v. Kobierowski lays out the proper procedure for an out-of-state
defendant who has successfully set aside a default judgment to preserve
his right to contest personal jurisdiction.34 Under Rule 123,35 "[b]y ap-
pealing [a default] judgment, a defendant submits to the trial court's juris-
diction," and no new service of process is necessary.36 However, the
defendant can avoid Rule 123's presumption that he has entered a gen-
eral appearance if, upon remand, he promptly files a special appear-
ance.37 Because the defendant in Boyd failed to do so for over six
months, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that his filing of a special
appearance after he was defaulted a second time was properly denied by
the trial court.38
IV. VENUE
During the Survey period, the Texas Supreme Court made significant
holdings regarding forum-selection clauses and the doctrine of forum non
conveniens.
In In re International Profit Associates, Inc., the Texas Supreme Court
held that "the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to enforce [sev-
eral] forum-selection clauses," all of which provided: "It is agreed that
exclusive jurisdiction and venue shall vest in the Nineteenth Judicial Dis-
trict of Lake County, Illinois, Illinois law applying." 39 The plaintiff ar-
gued that the forum-selection clauses were not enforceable, because "(1)
[they] . . . are ambiguous . . . (2) [the defendant] procured the clauses
through overreaching or fraud; (3) the interest of [plaintiff's] witnesses
and the public favor litigating this case in Texas; and (4) enforcement of
the clauses would effectively deprive [the plaintiff] of its day in court." 40
The supreme court began its analysis by confirming that
the party opposing enforcement [of a forum selection clause must]
clearly show[] that (1) the clause is invalid for reasons of fraud or
overreaching, (2) enforcement would be unreasonable or unjust, (3)
enforcement would contravene a strong public policy of the forum
32. Id. at 139-40.
33. Id. at 140.
34. 283 S.W.3d 19, 24 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2009, no pet.).
35. TEx. R. Civ. P. 123.
36. Boyd, 283 S.W.3d at 23.
37. Id. at 24.
38. Id. at 24-25.
39. 274 S.W.3d 672, 674 (Tex. 2009) (per curiam).
40. Id. at 675.
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where the suit was brought, or (4) the selected forum would be seri-
ously inconvenient for trial.41
With that in mind, the supreme court then analyzed each of plaintiff's
arguments.
First, the plaintiff argued that the clauses were ambiguous, because
they "do not mention 'litigation"' and "do not mention what, if anything,
is to be brought in the Nineteenth Judicial District Court of Lake County,
Illinois." 42 The supreme court rejected this argument and held that the
clauses were not ambiguous, because they were "not susceptible to more
than one reasonable interpretation"-that is, "fix[ing] jurisdiction and
venue for judicial actions between the parties in a specific location and
court in Illinois." 43
Second, the plaintiff argued that the clauses were procured by over-
reaching or fraud because the defendant's "representative initially con-
tacted [the plaintiff] in her Texas office, accepted payment in her Texas
office, and disclosed that the representative resided in Texas." 44 Accord-
ingly, the plaintiff argued that under these circumstances, the defendant
had a duty to expressly point out to the plaintiff that the contract had a
forum-selection clause. 45 The supreme court stated that to prove the fo-
rum-selection clause had been procured by overreaching or fraud, the
party must demonstrate that the clause resulted in unfair surprise or op-
pression.46 Here, the supreme court noted that the plaintiff had not ar-
gued "that it was surprised by the presence of the forum-selection clauses
in the contracts," but rather "that the clauses were not affirmatively dis-
closed." 47 This conduct did not amount to either overreaching or fraud. 48
Third, the plaintiff claimed that the interest of its witnesses and the
public favor litigating the case in Texas because all of its witnesses live in
Texas and the underlying events giving rise to the suit all occurred in
Texas. The supreme court rejected these arguments. With respect to the
location of the witnesses, the supreme court held that the plaintiff "could
have foreseen [the possibility of] litigation in Illinois for claims arising out
of [the] contracts ... and Illinois is not a remote alien forum for purposes
of forum-selection agreements." 49 With respect to the public-interest fac-
tors, the supreme court held that "policy considerations weigh in favor of
enforcing valid forum-selection clauses absent a statute that requires suit
to be brought . . . in Texas," which was not the case in this matter.50
41. Id.
42. Id. at 677.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 678.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 679.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 680.
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Finally, the plaintiff argued that it would be deprived of its day in court
because of "the expense of pursuing litigation in Illinois and the fact that
it would be forced to try two separate lawsuits" because one of the indi-
vidual defendants was not subject to jurisdiction in Illinois.5 ' The su-
preme court held, however, that to demonstrate it would be deprived of
its day in court, the plaintiff must prove that "special and unusual circum-
stances developed after the contracts were executed and that litigation in
Illinois would now be so gravely difficult and inconvenient that [the plain-
tiff] would for all practical purposes be deprived of its day in court." 52
The supreme court concluded that the plaintiff had not met this burden.53
In a second case styled In re International Profit Associates, Inc., the
Texas Supreme Court held that the trial court had abused its discretion by
requiring a party seeking to enforce a forum-selection clause to prove
that the specific clause was shown to the opposing party at the time the
parties entered into the agreement. 54 In this case, the plaintiff argued
that the defendant's failure "to show it the forum-selection clause
[amounted to] fraud or overreaching." 55 The supreme court rejected the
plaintiff's argument, because "[a] party who signs a document is pre-
sumed to know its contents." 56
In In re General Electric Co., the Texas Supreme Court analyzed
whether a trial court had abused its discretion by denying the defendants'
motion to dismiss on the basis of forum non conveniens.57 Texas Civil
Practice and Remedies Code section 71.051(b), the applicable forum non
conveniens statute, provides:
If a court of this state, on written motion of a party, finds that in the
interest of justice and for the convenience of the parties a claim or
action to which this section applies would be more properly heard in
a forum outside this state, the court shall decline to exercise jurisdic-
tion under the doctrine of forum non conveniens and shall stay or
dismiss the claim or action. In determining whether to grant a mo-
tion to stay or dismiss an action under the doctrine of forum non
conveniens, the court shall consider whether:
(1) an alternate forum exists in which the claim or action may be
tried;
(2) the alternate forum provides an adequate remedy;
(3) maintenance of the claim or action in the courts of this state
would work a substantial injustice to the moving party;
(4) the alternate forum, as a result of the submission of the parties
or otherwise, can exercise jurisdiction over all the defendants




54. 286 S.W.3d 921, 922 (Tex. 2009) (per curiam).
55. Id. at 923.
56. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting In re Lyon Fin. Servs., Inc., 257 S.W.3d 228, 232
(Tex. 2008)).
57. 271 S.W.3d 681, 684 (Tex. 2008).
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(5) the balance of the private interests of the parties and the pub-
lic interest of the state predominate in favor of the claim or action
being brought in an alternate forum, which shall include consider-
ation of the extent to which an injury or death resulted from acts
or omissions that occurred in this state; and
(6) the stay or dismissal would not result in unreasonable duplica-
tion or proliferation of litigation.58
Here, the plaintiff had "never lived or worked in Texas" but "sued nu-
merous defendants in Dallas County as a result of alleged exposure to
asbestos at his jobsite in Maine." 59 First, the plaintiff argued that al-
though Maine state courts were an alternative forum that provided an
adequate remedy, "his case would be vulnerable to removal to federal
court on diversity jurisdiction grounds." 60 If the case were removed to
federal court, it would become part of a multi-district litigation, and the
plaintiff would likely die before the case were tried. The supreme court
held that a comparative analysis of procedural processes and the time it
takes to get to trial were disfavored when evaluating motions for forum
non conveniens, and the possible delay did not deprive the plaintiff of an
adequate remedy.61
Second, the defendants argued it would be a substantial injustice to
them to try the case in Texas, because most witnesses and evidence were
out of state. The supreme court agreed, specifically noting that the evi-
dence and many fact witnesses were beyond the reach of compulsory pro-
cess, making it difficult to defend the case.62
Third, the plaintiff argued that not all of the defendants had proven
they were subject to jurisdiction in Maine. The supreme court held, how-
ever, that the defendants had previously agreed to jurisdiction in Maine,
and in any event, it appeared the defendants were subject to the Maine
long-arm statute.63
Fourth, the supreme court found that the public- and private-interest
factors weighed in favor of a Maine forum because Maine law would ap-
ply, and the evidence and witnesses were located in Maine.64
Finally, the plaintiff claimed that dismissal would "result in unreasona-
ble duplication of litigation" because there would be two lawsuits, one in
Texas against the non-moving defendants and one in Maine against the
moving defendants. 65 The supreme court disagreed, holding that the trial
court had the discretion to dismiss or stay the entire case and that the
extent to which litigation might be fragmented or duplicative depended
on the decisions made by the plaintiff.6 6 Accordingly, the supreme court
58. TEx. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.051(b) (Vernon 2008).
59. In re Gen. Elec. Co., 271 S.W.3d at 684.
60. Id. at 687.
61. Id. at 688.
62. Id. at 689.
63. Id. at 690-92.
64. Id. at 691-92.
65. Id. at 692.
66. Id. at 694.
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found that the trial court had abused its discretion by denying the motion
to dismiss. 67
V. PARTIES
In In re Greater Houston Orthopaedic Specialists, Inc., the Texas Su-
preme Court clarified the differences between "misidentification" and
"misnomer." 68 In this case, Greater Houston Orthopaedic Specialists,
Inc. (GHOS) filed suit against Jody Griswold and Peter Zavaletta, "alleg-
ing that they failed to pay GHOS approximately $35,000 for medical ser-
vices."69 GHOS then non-suited Griswold and Zavaletta's action."
Although the non-suit contained the correct cause number and style, it
identified GHOS as "Orthopaedic Specialists, L.L.P." and omitted the
"Greater Houston" predicate. Thereafter, Griswold and Zavaletta filed a
counterclaim. GHOS moved to dismiss the case on the basis that the suit
had been dismissed, but the trial court denied Ghos's motion. On appeal,
Griswold and Zavaletta argued that "GHOS's nonsuit was ineffective be-
cause it was filed not by the plaintiff, GHOS, but by 'Orthopaedic Spe-
cialists, L.L.P.,' a nonexistent entity."70 The supreme court held that this
was a case of "misnomer," which "occurs when a party misnames itself or
another party, but the correct parties are involved."71 This situation dif-
fers from the case of "misidentification," which "arises when two separate
legal entities exist and a plaintiff mistakenly sues an entity with a name
similar to that of the correct entity." 72 Accordingly, the supreme court
held that the trial court should have applied the "flexible" approach used
in misnomer cases, and had abused its discretion in refusing to dismiss the
case.73
VI. PLEADING
In In re Shelby, the Dallas Court of Appeals considered whether the
trial court had abused its discretion by ordering the defendants to amend
their verified denial, which denied that any partnership existed between
them. 7 4 During their depositions, one of the defendants testified that al-
though they were not "legal" partners with the other defendants, they
were "partners in a nonlegal sense because they collaborated on the pro-
ject" at issue.75 The trial court ordered that the defendants amend their
verified denial "to reflect the fact that they have made such statements
that a form of partnership existed." 76 The court of appeals, however,
67. Id. at 693.
68. 295 S.W.3d 323, 325 (Tex. 2009) (per curiam).
69. Id. at 324.
70. Id. at 325.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 326.
74. 297 S.W.3d 494 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2009, no pet.).
75. Id. at 496.
76. Id. at 495.
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found that the trial court had abused its discretion, because Texas Rule of
Civil Procedure 93 "does not require a defendant to make affirmative
representations in response to the plaintiff's allegations."77
In In re Metropolitan Lloyds Insurance Co. of Texas, the Dallas Court
of Appeals held that the trial court abused its discretion by continuing to
exercise jurisdiction over the case once the plaintiff had filed a non-suit.78
Here, the plaintiff filed suit "seeking a declaration of its rights and obliga-
tions under an insurance policy issued to [the defendant]." 79 The defen-
dant filed an answer which was titled "Defendant's Original Answer and
Original Counterclaim."80 However, the only reference to a counter-
claim was in his prayer for relief, which stated,
Defendant respectfully prays that upon a final hearing or trial of this
case that a take [sic] judgment be entered for Defendant on Plain-
tiff's claims, that a judgment be entered against Plaintiff on Defen-
dant's Insurance counterclaim, including Defendant's actual
damages, attorney's fees, interest and costs of court and that Defen-
dant receive such other relief to which it is justly entitled.81
The plaintiff subsequently filed a non-suit without prejudice, which the
trial judge signed with an order that each party pay its own court costs.
Thereafter, the defendant filed a "supplemental counterclaim," which in-
cluded new statutory and tort claims.82 The plaintiff sought dismissal of
the counterclaim, arguing that the trial court had no jurisdiction after the
non-suit. The trial court denied the motion, and the plaintiff appealed.
The court of appeals found that the plaintiff's non-suit disposed of all the
parties' claims and that no valid counterclaim survived the non-suit.83 In
particular, although the defendant's original answer contained the term
"counterclaim," nothing in the pleading put the plaintiff on notice of any
element of a cause of action or damages. Thus, even under a liberal con-
struction of the pleadings, defendant's original pleading did not constitute
a counterclaim. 84
VII. DISCOVERY
An insurance company's two different capacities in the same lawsuit
gave rise to an unusual application of the rules governing requests for
admissions in United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Goudeau.85 The
plaintiffs employer had both a worker's compensation policy and an auto
policy with underinsured-motorist coverage through United States Fidel-
77. Id. at 496-97.
78. No. 05-08-01712-CV, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 1764, at *1 (Tex. App.-Dallas Mar.
13, 2009, no pet.).
79. Id.
80. Id. at *1-2.
81. Id. at *2, 7.
82. Id. at *3.
83. Id. at *10.
84. Id. at *7.
85. 272 S.W.3d 603 (Tex. 2008).
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ity & Guaranty Co. (USF&G). When the plaintiff was injured in the
course of his employment, USF&G paid worker's compensation benefits,
but denied benefits under the underinsured-motorist coverage. After the
plaintiff sued USF&G for breach of the latter policy, USF&G intervened
using a different law firm to assert a subrogation claim for the compensa-
tion benefits it had paid to the plaintiff. Thus, USF&G appeared as both
an intervenor-plaintiff and a defendant in the case. As such, the Texas
Supreme Court held that where requests for admissions were served on
USF&G as an intervenor, its admission that the plaintiff was covered
under the underinsured-motorist policy was not binding on USF&G as a
defendant.86 Although the supreme court noted that there was no case
law on the issue and that USF&G might have avoided the confusion by
intervening in the plaintiff's name, the fact remained that "a party ap-
pearing in one capacity cannot be bound by an admission sent to it in
another."87
Whether to allow any discovery at all was at issue in two Texas Su-
preme Court decisions during the Survey period. In In re Houston Pipe
Line Co., the supreme court held that it was error for a trial court to
order discovery on the merits of a dispute before ruling on a motion to
compel arbitration.88 Conversely, in Ford Motor Co. v. Castillo, the su-
preme court held that it was error to prohibit discovery into potential
juror misconduct. 89
The Texas Supreme Court confirmed the conclusion reached by most
Texas courts of appeals that the sanction of excluding evidence not timely
disclosed in discovery applies to summary judgment proceedings as well
in Fort Brown Villas III Condominium Ass'n v. Gillenwater.90 The su-
preme court noted that before no-evidence summary judgment motions
became a part of Texas procedure, courts generally did not apply the ex-
clusionary sanction. 91 With the new no-evidence procedure, and in light
of the change in the discovery rules establishing pretrial deadlines that no
longer necessarily change with a change in trial date, the evidence
presented at the summary judgment and trial stages should be the same,
and the exclusionary rule applies equally to both.92
Rule 193.3(d) allows a "party who produces material or information
without intending to waive a claim of privilege" to belatedly assert the
86. Id. at 610.
87. Id. In his dissent, Justice Green argued that USF&G was but one legal person
with one interest itself and that any competition between the two corporate factions was
not a matter for the Texas courts. Id. at 613 (Green, J., dissenting).
88. No. 08-0800, 2009 Tex. LEXIS 468, at *5 (Tex. July 3, 2009). The supreme court
noted that by statute, a trial court may permit some discovery when necessary to obtain
information on the arbitrability question itself. Id. (citing TEX. CIv. PRAc. & REM. CODE
ANN. §§ 171.023(b), 171.086(a)(4), (6) (Vernon 2005)).
89. 279 S.W.3d 656, 662 (Tex. 2009).
90. 285 S.W.3d 879, 881-82 (Tex. 2009) (per curiam).
91. Id. at 881.
92. Id. at 882.
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privilege and "snap back" inadvertently produced material. 93 In In re
Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London, the Beaumont Court of Appeals
held that the rule's reference to a "party" is not intended to limit its pro-
tection only to the actual parties to the lawsuit. 94 The court of appeals
reached its conclusion based on the broad reach and interplay of the vari-
ous discovery rules governing parties and non-parties, as well as the re-
medial purpose of the rule. 9 5
Net-worth discovery was at issue in In re Jacobs.96 Although the Hous-
ton Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that the plaintiffs were entitled to
net-worth discovery based on their gross-negligence allegations, it ex-
pressed concern over the intrusion into a party's personal finances and
the opportunity for harassment that such discovery entails. 97 Accord-
ingly, the court of appeals concluded that limitations on the scope of dep-
osition discovery into that topic are appropriate, and that each defendant
need only state "(1) his or her current net worth, i.e., . . . total assets less
current total liabilities ... in accordance with generally accepted account-
ing principles . . . and (2) the facts and methods used to calculate
[same]." 98 No further inquiry should be allowed without a showing that
the information provided is inaccurate or incomplete. 99
Finally, the Dallas Court of Appeals took on the propriety of a deposi-
tion of a former U.S. president in In re Bush.100 The underlying suit
arose out of Southern Methodist University's purchase of a condomin-
ium complex, in which the plaintiff owned units, that ultimately was in-
cluded as part of the property on which the George W. Bush Presidential
Library will be located. After extensive discovery, including depositions
of the university's president and the former White House counsel, the
plaintiff sought to take the deposition of former President George W.
Bush himself. The court of appeals noted that the deposition of a former
or sitting president is an extremely rare event.10' Accordingly, the court
of appeals held that such a deposition "should only be compelled when
'his testimony would be material as tested by a meticulous standard, as
well as being necessary in the sense of being a more logical and more
persuasive source of evidence than alternatives that might be sug-
gested."1 02 The plaintiff did not meet this standard, and the court of
appeals therefore held that the deposition should not proceed. 03
93. TEX. R. Civ. P. 193.3(d).
94. 294 S.W.3d 891, 905 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2009, orig. proceeding [mand.
denied]).
95. Id.
96. 300 S.W.3d 35 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, orig. proceeding).
97. Id. at 41-42, 46.
98. Id. at 46.
99. Id.
100. 287 S.W.3d 899 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2009, orig. proceeding).
101. Id. at 902.
102. Id. at 903 (quoting United States v. Poindexter, 732 F. Supp. 142, 147 (D.D.C.
1990)).




In Ginn v. Forrester, the Texas Supreme Court dismissed a restricted
appeal that challenged the dismissal of a case for want of prosecution,
holding that while the trial court is required to give notice of a hearing on
its intent to dismiss for want of prosecution, the rules do not require that
the trial court clerk actually make a record of the mailing of those no-
tices.' 0 4 Here, the trial court apparently did not give the requisite notice
of its intent to dismiss the case for want of prosecution.105 Upon review,
the court of appeals suggested that for purposes of a restricted appeal, the
appellant could supplement the record with some evidence from the trial
court clerk showing the absence of any notice given of the dismissal hear-
ing. 106 The appellant complied and supplemented the record accordingly
with a notation from the trial court clerk indicating that the record was
devoid of any evidence of such notice. The supreme court dismissed the
appeal, holding that there is no difference for purposes of a restricted
appeal between "a record that is silent and a record that contains a writ-
ten notation that the record is silent." 0 7 In either case, any alleged error
was not apparent from the face of the record, and a restricted appeal was
not proper. 08
In Crites v. Collins, the Texas Supreme Court held that a pending mo-
tion for sanctions under the Medical Liability Insurance Improvement
Act' 09 filed before the entry of an order of voluntary non-suit did not
deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to consider the sanctions motion.110
Similarly, in Unifund CCR Partners v. Villa, the supreme court held that
the trial court's sanction order entered nine months after the plaintiff had
voluntarily non-suited the case was not void for lack of jurisdiction, be-
cause the defendant filed the sanctions motion before the order of non-
suit was entered, and the order of non-suit did not specifically address the
request for sanctions.11'
The Dallas and Fort Worth Courts of Appeals reached opposite conclu-
sions during the Survey period regarding the propriety of trial courts' dis-
missals of civil suits brought by incarcerated plaintiffs for their failure to
appear at mandatory hearings. In Ringer v. Kimball, a case heard by the
Fort Worth Court of Appeals, the trial court issued an order requiring the
parties to appear at a pre-trial conference. 112 Shortly before the hearing,
the incarcerated plaintiff moved for the trial court to issue a bench war-
rant, or alternatively, to allow the plaintiff to appear at the hearing by a
video conference call. The motion did not make any further explanation
104. 282 S.W.3d 430, 431 (Tex. 2009) (per curiam).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 432.
107. Id. at 433.
108. Id.
109. TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.351 (Vernon 2005 & Supp. 2009).
110. 284 S.W.3d 839, 843 (Tex. 2009) (per curiam).
111. 299 S.W.3d 92, 93, 96-97 (Tex. 2009) (per curiam).
112. 274 S.W.3d 865, 866 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2008, no pet.).
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regarding the need to attend the hearing. The trial court did not ex-
pressly rule on this motion, which was deemed overruled, and the inmate
did not appear at the pretrial conference. The trial court then dismissed
the case for want of prosecution. The court of appeals affirmed the dis-
missal, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing
to enter a bench warrant or allow the inmate to appear by video confer-
ence, because prisoners have no absolute right to appear in person for
every court proceeding.11 3 Moreover, the inmate's motion failed to show
on its face the need for the issuance of the bench warrant or the video
conference, as the supreme court required in In re Z.L. T.114
However, in Johnson v. Handley, the Dallas Court of Appeals reached
the opposite conclusion and reversed and remanded a dismissal for want
of prosecution of an incarcerated plaintiff where the trial court denied the
plaintiff's motion to issue a bench warrant or allow him to appear in court
by alternate means." 5 In reversing the dismissal, the court of appeals
held that, although the motion seeking the issuance of the bench warrant
was insufficient under the Z. L. T. standard because it failed to specify the
facts that required his personal appearance at the hearing, the denial of
the request to appear in court by alternative means was error.116 The
court of appeals held that an appearance before the trial court by tele-
phone would have been an effective way to allow the plaintiff to appear
at the hearing, and trial court's denial of the motion "rendered it impossi-
ble for appellant to comply with the requirements of the court's own
notice.""17
Finally, the Austin Court of Appeals in In re General Motors Corp.
held that a trial court's 2007 order purporting to vacate an order of dis-
missal that had been inadvertently issued in 2003 was void, because the
2007 order was issued after the trial court's plenary power had expired."18
In this car dealer dispute, the dealer filed suit in 1998 seeking damages,
which the trial court abated by an order entered in 2001 to allow the
dispute to proceed administratively before the Texas Motor Vehicle
Board. In 2003, while the suit was abated, the trial court inadvertently
sent notices of its intent to dismiss for want of prosecution, absent the
filing of a motion to retain. While counsel for the defendants received
the dismissal notice, counsel for the dealer did not, due to the clerk's
failure to note a change of address for the dealer's counsel. The following
month, the trial court dismissed the suit for want of prosecution. In 2007,
the dealer moved to lift the 2001 abatement order and subsequently dis-
covered that the suit had been dismissed in 2003. The dealer then sought
to declare the dismissal order void, because, among other reasons, it was
113. Id. at 867-68, 870.
114. Id. at 868-70; 124 S.W.3d 163, 165-66 (Tex. 2003) (setting forth the factors trial
courts should weigh in deciding whether to issue a bench warrant).
115. 299 S.W.3d 925, 927-28 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2009, no pet.).
116. Id. at 929; see Z.L. T., 124 S.W.3d at 165-66.
117. Johnson, 299 S.W.3d at 929.
118. 296 S.W.3d 813, 830 (Tex. App.-Austin 2009, orig. proceeding).
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issued during the abatement period. The trial court agreed and found
that its 2003 dismissal order was "null and void" as having been inadver-
tently entered." 9 The defendants then sought a writ of mandamus to va-
cate the 2007 order, which had declared void the 2003 dismissal order.
The court of appeals held that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter
its 2007 order vacating the 2003 dismissal order.120 While expressing its
displeasure that the defendants had sat silent for four years and allowed
the case to proceed administratively without ever advising the plaintiff or
the judicial system that the case had been dismissed, the court of appeals
nonetheless concluded that the 2003 dismissal order could not be de-
clared void by the 2007 order.121 The court of appeals concluded that by
2007, the trial court's plenary power had long since expired, and the exis-
tence of the 2001 abatement order when the 2003 dismissal order was
entered did not change that result.122
IX. JURY PRACTICE
In In re Bank of America, the Texas Supreme Court decided whether
its holding in In re Prudential Insurance Co. of America-which held that
in some circumstances a contractual waiver of jury trial was enforcea-
blel 23-creafes a presumption against waiver.124 In this case, the court of
appeals had held that the party seeking to enforce the waiver of the jury
trial provision had the burden of producing prima facie evidence that the
other party knowingly and voluntarily waived its constitutional right to a
jury trial. As an initial matter, the supreme court noted that the court of
appeals had misinterpreted the supreme court's decision in Prudential as
imposing a presumption against contractual jury waivers.125 Rather, Pru-
dential had held that contractual jury waivers do not violate public policy
and are enforceable.126 The supreme court stated that such a presump-
tion "would not only be contrary to the longstanding Texas contract prin-
ciple that parties are free to enter into contracts without fear of
retroactive nullification," but would also be erroneous for two other rea-
sons.127 First, "a presumption against contractual jury waivers wholly ig-
nores the burden-shifting rule articulated in General Electric, where [the
supreme court] held that 'a conspicuous provision is prima facie evidence
of a knowing and voluntary waiver and shifts the burden to the opposing
party to rebut it.' "128 The supreme court noted that Texas case law has
always presumed that "a party who signs a contract knows its con-
119. Id. at 820.
120. Id. at 830.
121. Id. at 821 n.6, 830.
122. Id. at 813, 821.
123. 148 S.W.3d 124, 130-33 (Tex. 2004).
124. 278 S.W.3d 342, 343 (Tex. 2009) (per curiam).
125. Id. at 343.
126. Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at 131.
127. Bank of Am., 278 S.W.3d at 344.




tents."129 Therefore, "[als long as there is a conspicuous waiver provi-
sion, [the party] is presumed to know what it is signing."o30 Second, the
supreme court in Bank of America held that "a presumption against
waiver would create an unnecessary distinction between arbitration and
jury waiver clauses, even though [the supreme court has previously] ex-
pressed that . . . jurisprudence 'should be the same for all similar dispute
resolution agreements."'1 3 1 Accordingly, the supreme court expressly
held that "Prudential does not impose a presumption against jury waivers
that places the burden on [the party seeking to enforce that provision] to
prove that the waiver was executed knowingly and voluntarily."1 3 2
In Moeller v. Blanc, the Dallas Court of Appeals addressed an attor-
ney's burden of proof when presenting a race-neutral explanation in re-
sponse to a Batson challenge.133 In this case, the attorney had used a
peremptory strike to exclude an African-American venire member from
the jury. The court of appeals first noted that the moving party had
demonstrated a prima facie case of racial discrimination and moved to
the second stage of the burden-shifting analysis, which required the re-
sponding attorney to provide "a race-neutral explanation for his use of
peremptory strikes." 134 Here, when asked to give his reasons for the per-
emptory strike, the attorney stated as follows:
On my notes, I don't know which ones are African-Americans and
which ones aren't, so I'm going to give the Court my reasons for
striking all eight that I struck, plus my alternate. . . . Juror No. 28, I
have no notes on that juror in response to anybody's question. I
have no response to any question [opposing counsel] asked. I have
no response to any questions I asked, and no response to any ques-
tions [other opposing counsel] asked, so I know nothing about that
person. And based on that, [I] was not comfortable putting that per-
son on the jury. 35
In other words, the attorney argued that he simply did not want to select
a juror that he knew absolutely nothing about. The court of appeals held
that "this assertion is not legally distinguishable from the cases holding
that a 'bad feeling' about a panelist is not an adequate race-neutral rea-
son."136 Rather, it was "too vague for a court to be able to judge its
legitimacy because it [was] not based on any observable facts."' 37 Ac-
cordingly, the court of appeals found that this proffered reason did not
constitute a race-neutral explanation, and it sustained the Batson chal-
lenge on appeal. 38
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 343-44 (quoting Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at 134).
132. Id. at 346.
133. 276 S.W.3d 656, 660 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2008, pet. denied).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 663.
136. Id. at 665.
137. Id.




In In re Minter Electric Co., the Dallas Court of Appeals addressed the
question of when a judgment becomes final in a multi-party case where a
summary judgment has been entered in favor of one defendant but an-
other defendant has not been served.139 In this personal injury dispute,
the plaintiffs sued a company and its employee. After the case had been
on file for ten months, the trial court granted a no-evidence summary
judgment motion in favor of the company, which was the only defendant
that had been served. Although the summary judgment order presented
to the trial court was entitled "Final Judgment," the court struck the word
"Final" from the order before signing it. Approximately one year later,
the trial court signed an order setting aside its summary judgment order
and scheduling the case for trial on the merits. The corporate defendant
sought a writ of mandamus, claiming that the initial judgment was final,
and therefore, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to modify its original
summary judgment order. The court of appeals denied the writ, holding
that mandamus was not proper, because the record did not conclusively
show that the plaintiff never intended to serve the individual defen-
dant.140 Thus, because the summary judgment order did not conclusively
dispose of all issues and all parties, it was not a final judgment. Rather,
the plaintiffs named the individual defendant in all of their pleadings,
provided an address where service could be obtained, and paid for service
to be issued on the individual defendant. Additionally, because the trial
court struck through the word "Final" before "Judgment" in its summary
judgment ruling, the court of appeals reasoned that this notation was a
further indication that the trial court did not intend for the summary
judgment ruling to be a final judgment.141 Last, the court of appeals ob-
served that the no-evidence summary judgment motion had been granted
after the case had been on file for only ten months.142 The court stated
that the length of time the case had been on file, while not determinative,
was also a factor to be considered in the decision to deny the request for
mandamus based upon lack of jurisdiction.143
In Lavender v. Lavender, the Texarkana Court of Appeals faced the
situation where the trial court in a divorce proceeding entered three sepa-
rate judgments, all on the same day, and all file stamped with the same
time.144 Two of the judgments purported to be final (i.e., containing lan-
guage stating they were disposing of all parties and all issues) on their
face, while the third judgment did not state it was a final judgment. Not-
ing that there can be only one final judgment in a case, the court of ap-
peals held that it was impossible to determine from the record which of
139. 277 S.W.3d 540, 543 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2009) (orig. proceeding).




144. 291 S.W.3d 19, 22-23 (Tex. App.-Texarkana, no pet.).
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the three simultaneously filed judgments was, in fact, the single "final"
judgment.145 Further, it was not possible in this case to read all three
judgments collectively as one. Therefore, the court of appeals reversed
and remanded the case to the trial court for further disposition.146
XI. MOTIONS FOR NEW TRIAL
The Texas Supreme Court issued several significant opinions on the
subject of motions for new trial during the Survey period. In Dolgencorp
of Texas, Inc. v. Lerma, the supreme court held that the trial court had
erred in failing to grant a motion for new trial after entering a post-an-
swer default judgment against the defendant when its lead counsel failed
to appear for trial because he was in trial in another county.147 In this
property damage suit, the defendant, although having previously an-
nounced ready for trial, sent an associate to the docket call in Cameron
County to advise the trial court that its lead counsel was preferentially set
for trial the next week in Harris County. Nonetheless, the trial court re-
quired the associate to select a jury and then instructed the jury to be
ready to return to start trial two days later. The next week, the defen-
dant's lead counsel was, in fact, called to trial in Harris County. Al-
though the Harris County judge and the associate placed numerous calls
to the Cameron County trial court advising them that the defendant's
lead counsel would still be in trial when the case was set to start, and
although the Harris County court actually wrote the Cameron County
trial court advising that it was having trouble reaching that court, the trial
judge in Cameron County called the case to trial. Neither the defendant's
lead counsel nor his associate was present. The trial court advised the
jury that it had received calls from both the associate and the Harris
County court, but not the defendant's lead counsel; therefore, the trial
court was going to discharge the jury and proceed with a bench trial. The
trial court then entered a post-answer default judgment against the defen-
dant. The trial court subsequently denied the defendant's motion for new
trial, which the court of appeals affirmed. The supreme court reversed,
holding that neither the defendant's participation in the selection of the
jury, nor its failure to file a verified motion for continuance, waived the
defendant's right to seek a motion for new trial.148 Moreover, because
the defendant's counsel and the Harris County court had gone to consid-
erable effort to try to advise the Cameron County trial court of the status
of the defendant's lead counsel in another trial, it had satisfied the ele-
ments for a motion for new trial as set forth in Craddock v. Sunshine Bus
Lines, Inc.149 The supreme court remanded the case for a new trial, but
declined to render judgment for the defendant based upon the insuffi-
145. Id.
146. Id. at 23.
147. 288 S.W.3d 922, 924 (Tex. 2009) (per curiam).
148. Id. at 925, 927, 929.




ciency of the evidence presented during the post-answer default judgment
prove-up.150 The supreme court reasoned that rendering judgment for
the defendant would have given the defendant more relief than it would
have received had its motion for new trial been granted.' 5' The supreme
court concluded its opinion by noting that trial courts should, and in most
instances do, extend professional courtesies to each other and the attor-
neys in instances like this, where counsel for a party is unable to appear
for trial because that attorney is in trial in another court.152
In two cases involving the granting of motions for new trial, In re Co-
lumbia Medical Center of Las Colinas,153 and In re E.I. du Pont de
Nemours and Co.,15 4 the Texas Supreme Court held that trial courts must
give more of an explanation than "in the interest of justice" as a basis for
granting motions for new trial that set aside jury verdicts.'55 In reaching
this conclusion, the supreme court noted that the majority of states re-
quire trial courts to articulate the bases for their decisions to set aside
jury verdicts, and held that Texas trial courts should likewise explain their
reasons for such decisions.156
In In re Lovito-Nelson, the Texas Supreme Court conditionally granted
a writ of mandamus, holding that a docket entry showing the granting of
a motion for new trial coupled with the entry of a new agreed scheduling
order by all parties did not meet the requirements of Rule 329b(c),157
which requires a signed, written order to effectuate the granting of a mo-
tion for new trial.158 To the extent that Thorpe v. Volkert'59 is inconsis-
tent with this ruling, the supreme court disapproved of that opinion.160
In In re Baylor Medical Center at Garland,161 the Texas Supreme Court
overruled its prior holding in Porter v. Vick,162 which precluded a motion
for new trial from being "ungranted" more than seventy-five days after it
was signed. The supreme court held that a trial court should be allowed
to set aside a new trial order at any time before a final judgment has been
entered.163 In this mandamus proceeding arising from a medical mal-
practice case, the jury found for the defendant, and the presiding trial
court originally entered judgment in its favor. That judge then granted
the plaintiffs' motion for new trial. In the meantime, the original trial
judge was succeeded by another trial judge, who first vacated the new-
trial order and reinstated the original judgment on the jury verdict, but
150. Lerma, 288 S.W.3d at 930-31.
151. Id. at 930.
152. Id.
153. 290 S.W.3d 204 (Tex. 2009).
154. 289 S.W.3d 861 (Tex. 2009).
155. Columbia Med. Ctr., 290 S.W.3d at 206; DuPont, 289 S.W.3d at 861.
156. Columbia Med. Ctr., 290 S.W.3d at 212-13.
157. TEX. R. Civ. P. 329b(c).
158. 278 S.W.3d 773, 775-76 (Tex. 2009) (per curiam).
159. 882 S.W.2d 592 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no writ).
160. Lorito-Nelson, 278 S.W.3d at 776.
161. 280 S.W.3d 227, 228, 232 (Tex. 2008).
162. 888 S.W.2d 789, 789-90 (Tex. 1994) (per curiam).
163. Id. at 231-32.
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then reconsidered that decision and reinstated the prior new trial order.
While the petition for mandamus was pending before the supreme court,
yet another trial judge succeeded the second trial judge. Accordingly, the
supreme court abated the mandamus proceeding to allow the current pre-
siding judge to review the pending motion for new trial because a manda-
mus may not issue against a new judge for a former judge's rulings.164
XII. DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES
In re Wilhite presented the issue of whether a trial judge should be
disqualified from presiding over a case because his previous law firm rep-
resented one of the litigants in similar lawsuits a decade before. 165 While
the judge was a partner at the law firm, the firm twice represented Alcoa,
Inc., in asbestos suits, although the judge was not personally involved in
the representation. The underlying case against Alcoa in this mandamus
proceeding concerned allegations of asbestos exposure at the same plant
during the same period of time. The trial judge nevertheless declined to
remove himself from the case, and a divided en banc Houston First Court
of Appeals held that he was not constitutionally disqualified from hearing
the case.166 The court of appeals reasoned that the case did not present
the same matter in controversy, in that the plaintiffs were different, and
certain other defendants named in the suit were different, suggesting that
the liability theories and defenses would be different as well. 167 Impor-
tantly, the court of appeals noted that the only issue before it was disqual-
ification, not whether the judge should be recused based on whether his
impartiality might reasonably be questioned, an issue on which the court
of appeals expressed no opinion.168
XIII. MISCELLANEOUS
During the Survey period, the Texas Supreme Court ruled on three
different issues regarding arbitration clauses.
First, in In re Morgan Stanley & Co., the Texas Supreme Court held
that the trial court, and not the arbitrator, should decide whether a party
had the mental capacity to enter into a contract that contained an arbitra-
tion agreement. 169 Although the supreme court recognized that the Fifth
Circuit had held in Primerica Life Insurance Co. v. Brown that the de-
fense of mental incapacity was an issue for the arbitrator and not the
court,170 it declined to follow that case.171 Rather, the supreme court
held that the Primerica case had been widely criticized and that formation
164. TEX. R. App. P. 7.2(b).
165. 298 S.W.3d 754, 756 (Tex. App.-Houston (Ist Dist.] 2009, orig. proceeding [mand.
denied]).
166. Id. at 761.
167. Id. at 759-60.
168. Id. at 761.
169. 293 S.W.3d 182, 183 (Tex. 2009).
170. 304 F.3d 469, 472 (5th Cir. 2002).
171. Morgan Stanley, 293 S.W.3d at 189-90.
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defenses, such as mental capacity, are matters that go to the very exis-
tence of whether an agreement to arbitrate existed and, as such, were
matters for the court to decide and not the arbitrator.172
Second, in In re Houston Pipe Line Co., the Texas Supreme Court ad-
dressed what amount of discovery was appropriate prior to compelling a
matter to arbitration.173 In this case, the trial court permitted discovery
on certain damage allegations and the existence of other potential de-
fendants before deciding on a motion to compel arbitration. Although
the Texas Arbitration Act authorizes pre-arbitration discovery when,
without it, "a trial court cannot fairly and properly make its decision on
the motion to compel" arbitration, the supreme court held that this au-
thorization does not allow discovery on the merits of the underlying
controversy.174
Finally, in In re Gulf Exploration LLC, the Texas Supreme Court had
the opportunity to discuss those rare instances where mandamus relief
would be available when a trial court compels arbitration.17 5 In particu-
lar, in In re Palacios, the supreme court held that mandamus relief was
generally unavailable for orders compelling arbitration, but stopped short
of saying it was never available. 176 Rather, the supreme court in Palacios
had noted that mandamus review might be available if an applicant could
show "clearly and indisputably that the district court did not have the
discretion to stay the proceedings pending arbitration."17 7 In Gulf Explo-
ration, the supreme court confirmed that "[i]f appeal is an adequate rem-
edy for an order compelling arbitration, mandamus must be denied."178
The supreme court stated that whether an appeal was "adequate" "de-
pend[ed] on a careful balance of the case-specific benefits and detriments
of delaying or interrupting a particular proceeding."1 79 However, since
"both the federal and state arbitration acts pointedly exclude immediate
review of orders compelling arbitration," the supreme court noted that
"any balancing [test] must tilt strongly against mandamus review."180 Ac-
cordingly, the delay and expense of an erroneous order compelling arbi-
tration would not, standing alone, render a final appeal inadequate.18'
Rather, the supreme court stated, "The 'adequacy' of an appeal may be a
closer question when the legislature has weighed in on both sides of the
balance."182 By way of example, the supreme court stated that manda-
mus review in another recent case was appropriate, because the arbitra-
172. Id. at 185, 190.
173. No. 08-0800, 2009 Tex. LEXIS 468, at *1 (Tex. July 3, 2009) (per curiam).
174. Id. at *5.
175. 289 S.W.3d 836, 841-43 (Tex. 2009).
176. 221 S.W.3d 564, 565 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam).
177. Id. (quoting Apache Bohai Corp., LDC v. Texaco China, B.V., 330 F.3d 307, 310-
11 (5th Cir. 2003)).







tion "threatened to undermine the legislative workers compensation
system as a whole."183 Accordingly, "In those rare cases when legislative
mandates conflict, mandamus [review of an order compelling arbitration
may be] 'essential to preserve important substantive and procedural
rights."'184
183. Id. at 843 (discussing In re Poly-America, L.P.,, 262 S.W.3d 337, 352 (Tex. 2008).
184. Id. (quoting In re Prudential Ins. Co., 148 S.W.3d 124, 136 (Tex. 2004)).
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